

## BETWEEN ART, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE (NOTES ABOUT INVENTION, POETRY AND PLAY)

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This text arises from the encounter point of three initial questions: *What is philosophy? What is science? What is art?* It tries to show that these three different disciplines (art, philosophy, science) are not as specific as it seems if we believe in the modern standard classifications. On the contrary, they may be founded in one and the same existential act: the aesthetical act of artistic creation. The text crosses then some themes of epistemology (Gaston Bachelard), astrophysics (Hubert Reeves), and philosophy (Gilles Deleuze), in an ethical and aesthetical perspective, trying to understand why and how these two questions are first and foremost inseparable questions.

*Key words:* Encounter, life, play, desire, invention, cosmology, science, art, poetry.

## ГДЕ-ТО МЕЖДУ ИСКУССТВОМ, ФИЛОСОФИЕЙ И НАУКОЙ (ЗАМЕТКИ ОБ ИЗОБРЕТЕНИЯХ, ПОЭЗИИ И ИГРЕ)

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Данный текст возникает из встречи трех изначальных вопросов: *Что есть философия? Что есть наука? Что есть искусство?* Это попытка показать, что три этих различных дисциплины (искусство, философия, наука) не настолько различаются, как кажется, если верить общепринятым

современным классификациям. Наоборот, они могут основываться на одном и том же экзистенциальном акте артистического созидания. Работа затрагивает также некоторые аспекты эпистемологии (Гастон Башляр), астрофизики (Хьюберт Ривз) и философии (Жиль Делёз), в попытке прийти к пониманию, почему этическое и эстетическое начала являются равнозначными и неотделимыми друг от друга.

*Ключевые слова:* Встреча, жить, игра, желание, изобретение, космология, наука, искусство, поэзия.

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These few notes are not exhaustive. They are current transcriptions of a work in progress. As usual, they are research's hypotheses, given to lectures and critics, hoping that they may contribute to the contemporary experimentation of thinking, living and creating today.

### *Introduction to Philosophy*

1. To begin, we would like to clarify some terminology presupposed in the following lines, especially about the first question (*What is philosophy*). First aspect: we would temporarily say, with philosophers of Greek Antiquity culture (particularly Plato, Socrates), that philosophy begins with this special *dialogue* called dialectics: hermeneutics progressing thanks to a maieutic process<sup>1</sup>. This process begins with postulating: *Philosophy is a way to question the world and oneself, and to try to elaborate something like – sense of existence*. According to the fact that “sense of existence” is *not already*

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<sup>1</sup> Read Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault about these questions. See references below.

written somewhere. Nobody can have the sense of your existence, and even each of us don't have his very own. If sense is not given, we have to *construct it*. Constructing sense that escapes our representations is one of the most essential tasks of philosophy.

2. Second aspect: we have to remind ourselves the concept invented by Lyotard, in the end of the Seventies, in the *Postmodern condition* (Lyotard, 1979, 71-82)<sup>2</sup>. "Postmodern" describes the fact that there are not any meta-narratives any more in what we call "developed" ("occidental") countries. There are not any meta-narratives, but something like a "new metaphysics" is appearing, gathering the new imperatives of time performance ("*performativité*"). With this in mind, we are not sure that techno-scientific progress is a real progress; notably as time acceleration seems today to generate some new psychic suffering: stress, depression, or even suicides<sup>3</sup>. Psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, sociologists, began to take an interest in this serious problem about one decade ago.

As for Lyotard, *postmodern* is simultaneously an *aesthetical* and *ethical* question. In a linguistic perspective (*langagière*), models of his questioning are artists. Besides, he writes: "*The artist and the writer [...] are working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done*". So, the artist always *thinks* something that *will* (in the future) at the same time *have been done* (in the past): this strange and contradictory temporal condition, as an infancy (*infantia*) or a *virtuality* (*un virtuel*) of what is (now) happening, is expressed by the word *modern* and the prefix *post*: "*Postmodern would have to be understood according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo)*". The problem is to *present* something that cannot yet be thought, as what was still called, in the modern period, "*avant-garde*". The

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<sup>2</sup> The report, commissioned by the Quebec provincial government, was about the condition of modern knowledge.

<sup>3</sup> In France, there are a lot of studies and documentaries about this problem (Dejours, 1998; Ehrenberg, 1991; Ehrenberg, 2010). In the *Essay about time and constitution of the contemporary self* (L'Harmattan, Paris, 2009), we demonstrated how these new sufferings are generated by new performativity imperatives. The problem of depression is sometimes named "burn out" in American culture. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), between 1999 and 2014, the rate of suicides in the USA has increased of 24%. Researchers from Harvard have studied how this phenomenon is linked to new work conditions in the Society of performativity (productivity). Cf. *New York Times* and *Liberation*, April 24, 2016. What we nowadays call "Crisis" is fundamentally an existential crisis, a crisis of *presence*.

question is aesthetical, artist trying to “name an Unnameable” (Beckett), and ethical, trying to “find” the unrepresentable sense of life, an *ethos*.

3. The third aspect of the question *What is philosophy?* would be: to live (to be still alive) requires an art of cultivating one’s free and unknown intimacy inside, a *no man’s land*. Losing the ability to do so would be like losing his own life, falling in spiritual depression, be struck by melancholy, and finally decay... In another text, called *Postmodern morality* (Lyotard, 1993), “General line”, dedicated to Gilles Deleuze and the resistance, Lyotard begins by a quotation. The quotation is from literature: Nina Berberova, in her novel, *Мыслящий тростник*, writes:

«Мне с самых ранних лет юности думалось, что у каждого человека есть свой *no man’s land*, в котором он сам себе полный хозяин. Видимая для всех жизнь – одна, другая принадлежит только ему одному, и о ней не знает никто. Это совсем не значит, что, с точки зрения морали, одна – нравственная, а другая – безнравственная, или, с точки зрения полиции, одна – дозволена, а другая – недозволена. Но человек время от времени живет бесконтрольно, в свободе и тайне, один или вдвоем с кем-нибудь, пусть час в день, вечер в неделю или день в месяц, он живет этой своей тайной и свободной жизнью из одного вечера (или дня) в другой, эти часы существуют в продолжении.

Эти часы либо что-то дополняют к его видимой жизни, либо имеют самостоятельное значение; они могут быть радостью или необходимостью, или привычкой, но для выпрямления какой-то «генеральной линии» они необходимы. Если человек не пользуется этим своим правом или вследствие внешних обстоятельств этого права лишен, он когда-нибудь будет удивлен, узнав, что в жизни не встретил самого себя, и в этой мысли есть что-то меланхолическое» (Berberova, 1958).

4. The fourth aspect of the question would be the following one. As Lyotard also used to say (Lyotard, 2012), the question we should ask is not: *What is philosophy?* But *Why?* Why doing philosophy? *Why philosophizing?* Is it because philosophy signifies desiring knowledge, desiring wisdom? Not only and not so simply. More fundamentally, philosophy means *desiring the desire*, learning to desire. Philosophy

signifies learning to *love the love* (in a way that should be analyzed, even if it is not possible here).

### I. Critical Science and Constructing

The philosophy of Gaston Bachelard used to question the links and the limits between literature (especially poetry) and science, between sensibility and rationality. In *The formation of scientific mind, a Contribution of psychoanalyze of the objective knowledge* (Bachelard, 2002), he tries to understand what is (scientific) knowledge, from a psychoanalytical (subjective) point of view. Firstly, one of the fundamentals of epistemology (of *epistemic science*) is to be a *critical science*. Therefore, we have to mark the difference between what we would call “scientism” (“scientisme” in French), and *scientific research*.

In the Chapter One Bachelard begins with the idea that “*the problem [of science] must be posed in terms of obstacles*” (Bachelard, 2002, 24). Some obstacles to what? To discovering reality, to understanding what is real. That’s why he adds that researcher has to understand that “*Reality is never ‘what we might believe it to be’: it is always what we ought to have thought*” (Bachelard, 2002, 24). We always *believe* that we *know* what is real. But *real* is never what it seems to be. It is what we *should have thought* (as a conditional and future anterior). So, the task of science is about what the Greek ancient culture (Socrates and Plato) used to name *doxa*. *Doxa* – opinion – is a kind of belief. It is what we believed, when we did not begin to think, to know *what is truth*. So that’s why Bachelard writes, “*Opinion thinks badly; it does not think but instead translates needs into knowledge.*” (Bachelard, 2002, 25). Because, most of the time, we do not think, but only *we want to believe as we want it to be!* “*By referring to objects in terms of their use, it prevents itself from knowing them. Nothing can be founded on opinion: we must start by destroying it*” (Bachelard, 2002, 25). This is one of the bases of the definition of science for Bachelard: *destroy opinion*. (Of course, it doesn’t mean that people can’t have free opinions. The problem is that there are some things in what we believe, and some others in what we cannot.) Opinion is a sort of liveliness manner to be, to consume ideas as dogma, like “*zombies’ existence*” (Mamardachvili, 1991). But – in

reality, “*nothing is self-evident. Nothing is given. Everything is constructed*” (Mamardachvili, 1991).

We could say that *something inside us*, mysteriously, is the source of this construction, and we can already understand it: *there is no fundamental difference between poet, artist and scientific researcher*. Scientific researchers don’t “discover” something already existing somewhere in the nature. *They don’t discover, it’s not given, they invent*.<sup>4</sup> Even if the medium is not language, is not the meaning and sonority of words, but something else, like numbers, equations, functions.

Bachelard said that scientific mind has to fight against opinion, and he adds: “*The scientific mind forbids us to have an opinion on questions we do not understand and cannot formulate. Before all else, we have to be able to pose problems. And in scientific life, whatever people may say, problems do not pose themselves. It is indeed having this sense of the problem that marks out the true scientific mind*” (Bachelard, 2002, 25). It means that being researcher is knowing that each time that we “discover” something, we are faced with a new paradox, with other problems. Scientific mind is not “finding solution”; it has to begin by *posing problems*. And philosophy is the same – art too. The beginning is to construct problems, in another manner to say it: to *make a diagnostic*.

But authority of something or someone can retain or block a development, and prevent a progress. Dogmatism is when ideas are not questioned any more, only fixed – when we can never change it any more: and this is the beginning of false-science, when science turns into dogma, into “scientism”. The “*formative instinct*” is to generate new ideas, while the “*conservative*” one is to affirm it as dogma, and if this happens, “*the conservative instinct then dominates and intellectual growth stops*” (Bachelard, 2002, 25): illness appears. Being dogmatist, by the tendency to think that an idea is true when this idea is useful<sup>5</sup>, we negatively influence the progress of thinking, which can “sclerose”. But the possibility of creating something new and the life are linked; from a cosmologic point of view life is

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<sup>4</sup> “It is true that a *mathematician* who is not somewhat of a *poet*, will never be a perfect *mathematician*” (Karl Weierstrass). (cited on Reeves, 1990, 200).

<sup>5</sup> Bergson, quoted by Bachelard: “*our minds have the irresistible tendency to regard the idea most often of use to them as being the clearest*” (Bachelard, 2002, 25).

creating new connections. Something is dying, when progress is not possible anymore. That's why closed systems are dying systems, and the question of opening is always the most important, in science, in life, everywhere...

The last point is that science, to become science, has to “*give up philosophical factors of easy unification such as the creator's unity of action, nature's unity of plan, or logical unity*” (Bachelard, 2002, 26). We often think – as an opinion – that science has to find unity. But the method and the movement of science is the opposite one. Rather than unifying, science tries to *specify, rectify, diversify*, when the question is finding some new problems; it means that this dynamic process always tries to escape from certainty and unity. Rather unifying, “*Specifying, rectifying, diversifying*” (Bachelard, 2002, 26), because certainty is not science; it is when we *believe* something, as in religion. But, science is firstly becoming uncertain, is learning to doubt, questioning. Thus, it is the experience of skepticism, hence the important in science is heterogeneity. “*Homogeneous systems present obstacles rather than imparting momentum*” (Bachelard, 2002, 27), the process of science is heterogeneous, always becoming-other, discovering, experimenting that there are always some *other* coming...

Consequently, according to this first reading focused on science, the aspects of constructing act would be: critics against opinion, also constructing problems (questioning *and* answering), formative against conservative instinct, diversifying rather than unifying. Inventing act may not strictly be human, but has some cosmologic, or *cosmical*, dimensions.

## II. Cosmos and Poetry

The second researcher we present in this reflection is not exactly a philosopher. Hubert Reeves, whose book is *Malicorne* (Reeves, 1990)<sup>6</sup>, also thinks and works on the border of different

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<sup>6</sup> Hubert Reeves is an astrophysicist from Montreal, Quebec. Malicorne is the name of a small village, in “Bourgogne-Franche-Comté”. In this region of the east of France, he has a house and he wrote this book where are explained all the lasted physicist theories in the end of the XXth century, while walking in fields, along rivers and wood, observing the incredible nature of our planet. Reeves is a lover of nature, planet Earth, cosmos. As for him, observing isn't possessing, collecting datas: it is contemplating, respecting, taking care, protecting.

disciplines. In this journal of nature meditations, the astrophysicist writes about science, humankind, psychology, psychoanalyze and poetry. He postulates that there is not such big difference between science and poetry.

With the aspects we just called to our mind with Bachelard, Hubert Reeves' text completely agrees. He says that the "essence" of science is *critical mind*. If science is not founded on critical mind, it can become a dangerous ideology<sup>7</sup>. Hubert Reeves adds that there is something in science that can never be "instrumentalized". The fundamentals of science can't be utility. Science may be used to construct technical objects, but fundamental scientists do not create new theories *because* they had an objective, *in order to...* something else. And why?

Firstly, Hubert Reeves answers to the question *What is science?* As an astrophysician, he simply writes: "*science is what we know*". And culture (art, technologies...) is not what we know but "*what we make*" (Reeves, 1990, 170). He adds that Pythagorism and, as Newtonism, all the mathematical traditions that derive from, were founded on the idea that *Universe would be written as a mathematical language*. But this "project" completely and definitively has been crushed in modern time (since 19th century). It crushed for many reasons, and especially for mathematical ones (not from outside, but from mathematics themselves): Gödel, for example, demonstrated that we cannot completely demonstrate a system, if we use the theoretical material inside of the same system. Thus, to do so, each time we would need another "meta-theory", that would demonstrate the theory, and so on endlessly. Therefore, a "global demonstration" is entirely impossible. Of course, we understand the reason: if we *believe* in the idea that everything in Universe is mathematically translatable and demonstrable, it means that *this belief* is not scientific: only opinion, and even religion<sup>8</sup>.

So, a definition of scientific mind is exposed in *Malicorne*: "*as much as teaching theories, our task [the task of scientific researchers as teachers] is to develop, in our students, the critical spirit*" (Reeves, 1990,

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<sup>7</sup> In the sense of (Arendt, 1972).

<sup>8</sup> Bertrand Russell (the philosopher and mathematician) believed, at the beginning, that we could do so. But he understood that it is not possible (meta-theory is endless), and that if we believe that, we are not in science but in religion (Russell, 1956).

169). Critical spirit is coming from rigor and skepticism (and exactly as in art and literature too). Without rigor and skepticism, science would not be a progress at all.

About Cosmos, Reeves brings back some few points of the current astrophysical theory: nowadays we know that Universe is about 15 Billion years old. It seems to be clear that Cosmos is in expansion, and at the same time *becoming colder*. This evolution – one of the most important aspect – is not closed, but *opened*. It is a *continuous opening movement*, rather than fixed and immobile one, so that there are three important dimensions of infinite: for a long time, we have known the dimension of infinitely huge of the cosmos. The second aspect is the infinitesimal dimension of the atoms. And the third aspect, that we more recently understood, is the infinite complexity of life.

Hubert Reeves says, that in fact, what is happening in the Universe is comparable to poetry. It doesn't mean of course that there would be "a God" who would have created the Universe, but he explains that, in Physics, there is some determinism. Events are often determined by general physical laws. But actually, general laws are also composed by indeterminism, by indecision, coincidence, things that happen, but with no determinism. And, what we name liveliness, vivacity, in reality *life* of universe, resides in this undetermined aspect. This is the aspect that Hubert Reeves names "creativity of Universe" (Reeves, 1990, 142). And then, he articulates that poetry, in this meaning, is a cosmical process. Thus, thanks to this indecision, there is possibility of local "creation" of "organization". We are used to say that the general law of Universe, coming from Principle of Thermodynamics, is entropy, a return to "inorganization". But general law doesn't prevent from creation of local organization, on the contrary. According to Reeves, life is not an "error" in the general process, but life in planet Earth appeared *inside* the process, even if it *locally* contradicts the general law<sup>9</sup>. But why then?

From the point of view of Cosmos, as the point of view of invention of theories, the answer is comparable: scientists – as poets

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<sup>9</sup> Even more: as Jean Baudrillard studied it, entropy can completely be one destructive form taken by systems, structures and organization. Organization can destruct life and generate death and chaos, as human history doesn't stop testifying us (Baudrillard, 1981).

– only *play*. They do not work – they *play*. It is a *game*. This play is the possibility of creating, and becoming always else. Reeves elaborates this idea from the psychoanalyst Winnicott (Winnicott, 1971), who demonstrated how *the game is the most important function of humanity*. Beginning by children; everybody knows that children *need* to play. They need to play because when they do so they *construct* their *own relation* to reality. Their imagination needs to do so to construct themselves. So, when one child imagines, realizes games, it is a manner of constructing *his* reality. Scientific researchers, artists, everybody in reality, try or is able to continue this sort of play when they are adults (Freud, 1933).

Based on that reasoning, scientific mind is not completely different than poetry, because both are *game*. So, when mathematicians “discover” a new theory, they do approximately the same as poets, as musicians... with some different languages. They create. That is in a way that Wittgenstein names “language game”: a game doesn’t only mean playing, but also *constructing rules*. (In fact, not only between different disciplines, but between all the sciences, there are very different worlds and it is often difficult (even impossible) to unify it. Even when we study science, we should never reduce what we *are* in what we study.) Researcher (in the largest meaning: in art, in philosophy, in science) has to create something that *is not thinkable now* (and maybe will never be), where at the same time rules have to be invented too. That’s why, as wrote Thomas Kuhn, scientific “progress” (if we can say so) is not linear and continuous; every time revolution is happening, that create completely new paradigms (Kuhn, 1962).

And thus, game (in this meaning, a play different of one pure entertainment) is working against depression, “melancholy” (would say Berberova), and in reality if adult do not continue to play, then it becomes a sort of “degradation”<sup>10</sup>. Teachers always have this difficult and magnificent task too: pedagogy is something that cannot be transmitted as information; it is an *art* (art of education). Some people can teach, other cannot (even if they can do other things...). And that’s why the question about transmission of knowledge is one of the first questions of Socrates’ philosophy: the relation of dialectics

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<sup>10</sup> The expression is by AN.

and maieutics in the philosophy of Plato and Socrates (linked, as used to demonstrate Jacques Lacan (Lacan, 1960-1961), to the modern question of *transferring affect*), is this kind of undetermined game. Because in education, transmission of knowledge is not like in (what we believe it to be in) machines, as if any package of knowledge could be implanted in minds. The phenomenon is not so simple with human, and or with animal. Maieutics is the idea that *I don't have any knowledge to teach you*, said Socrates. The truth is *in you*, and if I am "here", it is only so that we can try to "create" the truth together, through dialectics. Education is something complex, at the same time as a *science* (knowledge) and as an *art*, playing with words, as music with sound, painting with colors, cinema with movement...

And that is why theories are completely disconnected to (the so-called) "reality". They are abstract. Only afterwards and only possibly, physicians – maybe other physicians that the "inventor", – may find an application, and observe that the theory is efficient to "explain reality". It means that when an "inventor" plays, he doesn't *wait for a result*. If there is a result, only afterwards, later, we may discover it. Again, it is the same in art: if we speak about capitalism (rules of market), there is a irreconcilable difference between "artist" who would create *to sell his products* – therefore, he is not an artist – and artist who *creates* only to create (or to destruct, to undo, but not *in order to* something else), selflessly, for the simple enjoyment of gaming. Every artist knows that. Because, we have to add something else: invention is surely a play, but *necessary play*. Art is as vital as breathing air. Artist absolutely needs this game to exist. He doesn't do it for a result, for anything else. And if it happens that artist earns money with it, it's another, secondary question – even if at the same time for subsistence it can be a primary one. And according to these hypotheses it would be the same in science. That's why we speak about "*fundamental researches*". The scheme of fundamental science is an *opening*: you *never know in advance where you are going* when you invent.

Maybe, from an existential point of view, it is possible to say that every life is a game, but only in the meaning that every individual is a *singularity*. It implies that there are as many differences as there are people on planet Earth. Montaigne said that there is more difference between one human and another one than

between human and animal species. He meant that everybody has his own singularity, even if we all live in the same planet, almost speak the same languages, and can share things and ideas. It doesn't mean either that we have to be individual, egoist or selfish. But *sense of existence* is singular. Everyone "has" (researches) his own sense, and maybe many senses at the same time.

Invention, in art, in philosophy, in science, is an expression of life, whose form is appearing *in* and *from* playing. Game goes beyond the human form, its dimension is cosmic, crossed by forces that appeared billions of years before our existence and which will survive well after our death. *Poetry is a cosmic phenomenon*. The singularity of each living form is one possible expression of the fact that worlds of signification (semiotic universes) are perpetually in movement, can encounter, separate, continuing their endless becoming... Like with people: one may encounter, share something together – singularities may be "shared", – and afterwards, each one, like in a rhizome, may continue his unpredictable trajectory...

### *III. Game, Play and Gaping, Rencontre*

In this last part, we would like to link what was said before with some aspects of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze is one of these philosophers who see the future, not for the twenty years, but for the centuries that are coming, as Nietzsche, from whom he was inspired. Why do we feel here that we can link epistemic sciences, cosmology and philosophy?

As it is well-known, Deleuze showed that when we separate human culture in three main disciplines, science, art, philosophy, all these disciplines *create* something. Philosophy creates concepts; art creates percepts (affects, flowing of sensations); and science creates functions. The center of these three activities is creativity. Deleuze's thinking also radically contests the existence of substance, essence, idea of Nature, of Being, because there can never be something definitively fixed. Everything is *becoming*. At first is *heterogeneity*. The thinking of Deleuze is like an opened system. So in (his) philosophy, there is never a central point. No hierarchy, no linearity, the old Cartesian rationality is out of order. Indetermination is ontologically an anterior and superior force, more fundamental than achieved and

stable, organized forms.

The virtual is one of the important aspects of his thought, not exactly as a technological phenomenon (even if it can be too, but not only and not initially). Virtual means that the most important is not what *is* but what *may* be, what *may* happen (“*ought to*”, said Bachelard). It is an *opening* of possibilities. The most important is not what is actual, realized facts, but what in the facts keeps opened, is still possible: the possibility to be something other, the reserve of what may or might happen. Always something else can happen, and this is one similar point with Hubert Reeves, in a cosmical perspective.

And there is another outstanding aspect of Deleuze’s logics. He thinks another kind of Logics, based on “disjunctive synthesis” (Mengue & Cavaillez, 2012) (*chaosmosis*). It means that, traditionally (especially since Cartesianism), European tradition always separated ideas in logic of binarity: the one / the other, what is / what is not, life / death, before / after and so on: the question concerns *time* and *being*. And as for Deleuze, this separation is not true. Not only because we clearly know how disastrous it has been each time when people decided to separate and fix the one and the other (for example Good and Bad), and to take irreversible decisions from that moment – but because the more important is not entity itself, but the *gap* (the *difference*) between (two) entities.

Yet, this is the question of the game. “Jeu” (in French) means at the same time *game* and *gaping*. This play is a phenomenon in mechanical systems and theories. Mechanical systems always need a gaping (“*un écartement*”) to function: a margin of tolerance, which is the reserve of “freedom” that the system needs to be functional and operative. If it is not the case, it is fast going to self-destruction.

It also means that, existentially, we cannot separate *life* and *death*. When we separate it, we are already trapped in binary thought, and we don’t even know what we are speaking about. Socrates said that *living is learning to die*, didn’t he? It doesn’t mean that we *want* to die. It doesn’t mean either that we always *have to think* anxiously, that death is coming now. It only means that maybe living and dying are the same becoming, we have *to prepare to die*, in a spiritual sense (rather than material, possessive sense) – as

Montaigne said too<sup>11</sup>. It is a becoming, death is not the opposite of life, life and death becomes mixed up in our becoming, our existence. Understanding this appeals to overcome paradoxes, another main aspect of Reeves perspectives.

To go a step further, we shall speak about what we called here *encounter*. Maybe we will see that it is *the question* of invention. The word is the translation of "*rencontre*". At first glance, "*rencontrer*" can usually be translated by *meeting*. But what do we mean when we say "we meet someone"? What is "someone"? It means: *Who are you* (and who is *she/he*)? We presuppose to have an explanation of identity, but no simple answer can exist. Deleuze says that if we cannot really *meet someone*, something like *encounter* can happen. But encounter is not really "with someone", it is rather with *something in* (someone): one's gesture, one's smile, one's voice intonation – one's sensation (that is to say: one *esthetical impression*). And it can also be ideas, colors, sounds: an *event*, something that was not supposed to happen, occurs. Something that could not be predetermined, programmed, begins to resonate, entering in communication, without us knowing *what* and *why*. (We can understand how and why it is linked with the question of love. Before the possibility to love someone, we have to begin to learn to *love the love*: love cannot be determined in advance. It is one of the most intense forms of event, and in contrary of *having* something, it is accepting not to have. Love is accepting not to possess, and desire is an expression of the absence, of something that is not here, of what lacks. We can of course love someone, and live together with him/her. But loving means at the same time, that we feel the lack, the absence of "the other". If not, if we feel the other as if we possessed him or her, is it still real love?)

We can give an example of the idea of *rencontre*: one cineaste is going to make a film. He read a beautiful roman, from which he decided to make a film. We name this phenomenon "adaptation". For Deleuze, it is not art. It can be interesting to make money (interesting for example for Hollywood most common conception of cinema). But, in art, the question is completely other. It is not exactly "adaptation", it is something else, it is encounter. It means that, when moviemaker is reading the book, something is happening: an

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<sup>11</sup> "That philosophize is to learn to die", says the famous Chapter of the Essays.

event encounters his own feelings, or ideas. And when he is going to make the film, he will try to *testify* this event. This is not a linear process (transform a book in a film), and there can be many kinds of encounters: even if it is surely a human question, it is also a more fundamental one (somehow ontological question), so that philosophical ideas can encounter artistic, scientific ideas, etc. There is something that enigmatically *enters in resonance* between two or more entities.

So, this definition of *encounter* is connected to what said Nina Berberova, in *Мыслящий тростник*. A part of mystery, of *unknown* in each of us, called *no man's land*, wakes up and begins to resonate, as in the love story narrated in the novel.

We will stop for now with these words. It would also be interesting to remember that “science” is coming from *scientia*, which used to mean “knowledge” (“*le savoir*”). And knowing, “discovering”, comes from existential desire (for example, for physician, an ancient, often forgotten desire, coming from childhood, to understand what is universe, why “we are here”, and so on). As for technology, it comes from the word “technics”, which comes from the Greek *tekhnè* – that means something else than only instrumental meaning, but at the same time, with an esthetic meaning, *art*. So *tekhno-scientia* is about *knowing* and *practicing*, in an existential and artistic way, one's life. Yet, as life, sense is created in one point of difference, one gap, one game.

In this text we used to say “discover”, “construct”, “create”, “invent”... “Invent”, from *invenire*, expresses well simultaneously the double direction: *imagine* and *find*. But Reeves says that we would need a better word to say that – neither discover, neither create – and we can observe that this word unconsciously emerges from the pages we read, in some multiple variations: between gap and game, between all binary vulgar oppositions, in the interstice where, we don't know why, something is happening, things are encountering.

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